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Abstract 
Using a dynamic network DEA approach, this research examines the efficiency performance of 
major Chinese and Indian carriers with a consideration of the airline company’s internal 
processes and links as well as the carry-over items that connect consecutive time periods. It has 
been found that three low-cost carriers (LCCs), namely, China’s Spring and India’s SpiceJet 
were the most efficient carriers during the period between 2008 and 2015. China’s three state-
owned airlines performed poorly in both the capacity generation and service stages, particularly 
the latter.  The second-stage regression results confirm that the LCC model and private 
ownership are significantly associated with better airline efficiency performance. This paper thus 
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calls for continual reforms in China’s air transport including further privatisation and policy 
support for LCCs and private carriers to improve the overall efficiency of this industry.  
Key words: China, India, efficiency, dynamic and network DEA, private airlines, low-cost 
carriers  
JEL codes: L51, L93, L98 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction  
Both China and India commenced the process of privatising their state-owned enterprises in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s. However, India had the advantage of starting the reforms from a 
mixed economic system where the public sector enterprises (PSEs) dominated the “core” sectors 
of the economy including the airline industry while the private sector enterprises played an 
important role in the “non-core” industries. In contrast, China had to develop a market economic 
system from scratch (Chai and Roy, 2006). The share of PSEs in GDP in India was 25% in the 
early 1990s. Due to the strong resistance of vested interest groups including trade unions (Chai 
and Roy, 2006), a large part of the value of PSEs have not been privatised including the 
government owned Air India. However, the contribution of the private sector to GDP growth has 
been over 80% since the 2000s. When China began its privatisation in the 1980s, the share of the 
private sector was less than 1% of its GDP. Three decades later, the private sector has now 
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contributed to 60% of the nation’s GDP and 90% of the new jobs. Thus, the degree of 
privatisation in India has been much deeper and broader historically and currently. 
In China, the government controls firms in almost all strategically important industries. The 
average state ownership in publicly listed companies was about 70% in 2002 and was still the 
case in 2017. In the case where the Chinese government is a minority shareholder in a privatised 
SOE, it still retains a control over the firm through appointing top managers and boards of 
directors (Xu and Wang, 1999). The heavy influence of Chinese government on listed companies 
was confirmed by a report by S&P Global Ratings in 2016 (Allirajan, 2016). The report finds 
that India’s top 200 companies, particularly the private companies, outperform their Chinese 
peers in several financial indicators despite India’s infrastructure bottlenecks. There is large 
difference in the size of the private sectors. The private firms account for 75% of the net debt and 
earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortisation of the 200 companies in India, 
while this figure is less than 20% for the top Chinese companies.   
Air transport had long been regarded as a core industry that should be regulated and protected in 
China and India due to its significant national security and sovereignty implications in the 
history. As with other industries of the two countries, deregulation and privatisation in this sector 
began in the 1980s. However, up to now, China’s aviation market is still dominated by state-
owned carriers although all the major carriers have been partly privatised in the late 1990s and 
early 2000s. In 2016, Chinese carriers transported 436 million passengers with the “big three” 
state-owned airline groups, Air China, China Eastern and China Southern, commanding a market 
share of 24%, 22%, and 25%, respectively. Members of the Hainan Aviation Group (HNA), a de 
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facto private airline group,1 held a market share of some 14%. The share of other private airlines 
in the passenger market was less than 16%. In contrast, the Indian market has now been 
dominated by private carriers with major private carriers such as Jet Airways, SpiceJet, IndiGo, 
Vistara, AirAsia India, and Go Air, carrying 82 million passengers, representing a market share 
of 79% in the 2015-16 financial year (Wang et al, 2018). The market share of the government-
owned carrier, Air India, was less than 15%. With such stunningly different governance 
structures in airline companies in the two countries, it is expected that the performance of airlines 
would be substantially different. Although research comparing the economic reforms and 
development between the two economies is voluminous, comparative studies into a particular 
industry remain rare. This research aims to fill the literature gap by investigating the efficiency 
performance of the airline companies in the two countries and exploring the likely determinants 
of the performance. 
The findings of this study suggest that China’s state-owned airlines are far less efficient than 
their Indian counterparts, in both the capacity generation stage and the service stage. Private 
ownership and the LCC business model are key to determine the airline efficiency performance. 
Next section briefly reviews the air transport sector in the two countries. Related studies are 
discussed in section. Section 4 presents the methodology and data, followed by the section of 
results and discussion. The last section contains policy implication and conclusion. 
                                                          
1 Hainan Airlines was established as a state-owned carrier jointly owned by Hainan Province and the Civil Aviation 
Administration of China (CAAC). In the last 30 years, it has evolved from a regional airline into a global 
conglomerate with stakes in more than 10 Chinese carriers including Hainan Airlines, Capital Airlines, and Hong 
Kong airlines. HNA Group also has significant investment in the sectors of tourism, finance, logistics, real estate, 
etc. The evolvement of ownership structure of HNA Group was not transparent and remains a mystery. A charity 
organisation, Cihang Foundation, is now the largest shareholder according the HNA group website.  
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2. The development of China and India’s air transport   
In 1994, Air India and Indian Airlines were corporatized following the repeal of the Air 
Corporations Act 1953. Private carriers including Jet Airways was allowed to operate scheduled 
services. Jet Airways surpassed the state-owned Indian Airlines in 2001 and became the largest 
carrier in the domestic market. India’s first LCC, Air Deccan, was established in 2003, and this 
model was quickly replicated with SpiceJet, IndiGo, GoAir and JetLite being launched between 
2005 and 2007. As Air India and Indian Airlines kept losing ground to the private counterparts, 
the government then decided to merge the two in 2007, leading a wave of consolidations in the 
airline industry. For example, Jet Airways acquired the failing Air Sahara and renamed it as 
JetLite in 2007. Deccan was taken over by Kingfisher Airlines in 2008.2 The Indian government 
has long considered privatising or at least partly privatising the national airline, but this goal has 
never been achieved mainly because of the political reasons and opposition from the trade union. 
In 2017, IndiGo was the largest domestic carrier with a market share of about 40% in terms of 
the number of passengers carried. Jet Airways was in the second place. The national carrier, Air 
India, was in the third place and only commanded a share of about 13-14%.     
China’s private airlines emerged in 2005 immediately after the air transport sector was opened to 
domestic private investors (Zhang and Round, 2008). By 2007 some 20 new private airlines had 
been established including Shanghai-based Spring Airlines and Juneyao Airlines, which are now 
the two largest private carriers in China. Spring has positioned itself as an LCC while Juneyao 
operates as a full service carrier (FSC). Also in 2005, several large shareholders (state-owned 
                                                          
2 Kingfisher failed in 2012 due to financial problems, and subsequently its domestic and international flight 
entitlements were withdrawn by the government (Wang et al., 2018). 
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companies) sold their shares in Shenzhen Airlines to private companies and thus Shenzhen 
Airlines became privately owned. However, from 2007 the private airlines experienced huge 
setbacks. Many of the new private airlines quickly failed due to the lack of capital, experienced 
pilots and skilled personnel, along with the high costs and taxes associated with aircraft 
purchases, jet fuel and airport charges (Zhang and Zhang, 2016). Also because they brought 
intense competitive pressure to the domestic aviation market, which was deemed undesirable to 
the CAAC. In 2007 the CAAC decided to suspend the approval of new domestic entrants until 
2010. This policy was not repealed until 2013. Zhang and Lu (2013) argue that China’s 
competition policy does not favour the private carriers. For example, mergers in the air transport 
sector were rarely investigated and challenged, especially when private airlines were the merger 
target. United Eagle Airlines was taken over in 2009 by state-controlled Sichuan Airlines due to 
United Eagle’s poor financial performance, and renamed to Chengdu Airlines. Shenzhen Airlines 
was taken over by Air China in 2010. In 2009 the Wuhan-based private carrier, East Star Airlines 
was forced to cease operation after it rejected the proposed takeover by Air China.  
The volumes of passengers and freight carried by major Chinese and Indian state-owned airlines 
and private airlines in 2015 are reported in Figures 1 and 2. It is obvious that China’s three major 
groups operate in a much larger scale than any of their Indian counterparts. However, China’s 
LCC (privately-owned) carried passengers and freight less than half of those by India’s largest 
LCC, IndiGo.  
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Figure 1. Passengers carried by major Chinese carriers (2015) and Indian carriers (2015-2016FY) 
 
 
Figure 2. Freight carried by major Chinese carriers (2015) and Indian carriers (2015-2016FY) 
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Chinese government can exert a strong influence on Chinese firms’ corporate governance and 
performance as shown in Qian (1996) and Che and Qian (1998). One of the main channels is 
through direct control of the majority shares of the companies in key industries, particularly in 
the armaments, power generation and distribution, oil and petrochemicals, telecommunications, 
coal, aviation and shipping industries. Mixed results have been produced regarding the 
relationship between state ownership and Chinese firms’ performance. Detrimental effect of state 
ownership on firm performance has been revealed in Xu and Wang (1999), and Sun and Tong 
(2003) while Le and Chizema (2011) find positive correlation between government ownership 
and firm performance. An inverse U-shaped relationship is reported in Sun et al. (2002) and Tian 
and Estrin (2008). Some studies such as Wang (2005) contends that there is no systematic 
relation between ownership structure and firm performance, even when different performance 
measures are used. Chen et al. (2017) investigated six listed Chinese airlines, and found a U-
shaped relationship between state ownership and firm performance for the airline industry. Using 
a traditional Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) approach, Chow (2010) shows that since the 
entry of private carriers in 2005, non-state-owned airlines performed better than their state-
owned counterparts. It seems that strong competition brought about by the new private carriers 
did not help improve the efficiency performance of the state-owned carriers.  Wang et al. (2014) 
compared the performance of leading Chinese carriers with representative foreign airlines. They 
concluded that Chinese airlines steadily improved their operational efficiency from 2001 to 2010 
but they still lag behind leading airlines in developed markets.  
For the case of India, Saranga and Nagpal (2016) used a DEA approach to evaluate the technical 
and cost efficiencies of major Indian airlines and in the second stage, panel data based regression 
models were used to identify factors driving these efficiencies. Their study finds that the national 
9 
 
carrier Air India was among the most technically efficient airlines during 2005–2007, but both 
technical and cost efficiency dropped after the 2007 merger between Air India and Indian 
Airlines. The technical efficiency scores of the LCCs such as SpiceJet, Go Air and IndiGo were 
consistently high and close to the frontier, but the cost efficiency scores were comparatively low 
for many LCCs. Saranga and Nagpal (2016) also report that the LCC business model, 
participating in international air services, and pricing power are significantly associated with an 
airline’s efficiency performance. Similar findings are reported in Jain and Natarajan (2015) using 
the DEA approach.  
It should be noted that most of the above-mentioned studies have used DEA to measure the 
operating and technical efficiency. This approach and its various extensions have been widely 
used in the air transport literature (see e.g., Ahn and Min, 2014; Tsui et al., 2014; Georgiadis et 
al. 2014; Gutiérrez and Lozano, 2016),3 to assess the efficiency of Decision-Making Units 
(DMUs) with multiple inputs and outputs based on the framework of Farrell (1957). The DMUs 
can be either airports (Lam et al., 2009; YU, 2010; Merker and Assaf, 2015; Liu, 2016; lo Storto, 
2018; Lozano et al., 2013) or airlines (Tavassoli, et al., 2014). This non-parametric linear 
programing technique was formally developed by Charnes, Cooper, and Rhodes (1978). 
Compared with the parametric approach, the non-parametric approaches do not require a priori 
assumption on functional form specification which may restrict the frontier shape (Berger and 
Humphrey, 1997). A good survey of the application of the traditional DEA can be found in Yu 
(2016).  
                                                          
3 Econometric approach such as stochastic frontiers is another commonly used approach to measure efficiency. 
See González and Trujillo (2009) for a good discussion of the differences between the two approaches. 
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The traditional DEA approach has evolved substantially in the last two decades, especially in the 
last 10 years.  However, traditional DEA models treat the operational process of the DMU as a 
black box without considering the internal structure of the processes in the DMU’s operation (Yu 
and Chen, 2017). In contrast, the network DEA considers the internal structure of a DMU as 
many companies comprise several stages, each of which may use its own inputs to produce its 
own output (Färe and Grosskopf, 2000). Readers can refer to Kao (2014) for a review of the 
recent development of the network DEA model. Traditional DEA models also ignore the 
intertemporal efficiency change as it does not consider the connecting activities or carry-overs 
between periods. The operation of a DMU in one period is not independent of that in another 
consecutive period (Yu and Chen, 2017). Therefore, dynamic DEA models have been developed 
(Färe and Grosskopf, 1996; Tone and Tsutsui, 2010, 2014). A comprehensive review of the 
dynamic and network DEA models can be found in Mariz, et al. (2018).  
This research will apply the dynamic network DEA (DNDEA) model introduced in Tone and 
Tsutsui (2014) to measure the efficiency of major Chinese and Indian airlines by considering 
both the internal processes of airline companies and the existence of carry-overs that connect two 
consecutive periods in the airline industry. The DNDEA is the composite of network DEA and 
dynamic DEA. To the best of our knowledge, studies comparing airline efficiency and the 
underlying drivers in China and India are rare, let alone the use of the DNDEA for such 
comparison. This research aims to fill this gap. 
4. Methodology and Data  
4.1 The Dynamic network DEA model   
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We build our DNDEA model under the constant returns-to-scale (CRS) assumption4 and within 
the slacks-based measure (SBM) framework proposed by Tone and Tsutsui (2014).5 The 
operation of a transport organisation usually involves two stages: the production stage (or 
process) and the service stage (Yu and Chen, 2017). For a typical airline company, in the first 
stage, capacity is produced and in the second stage, the capacity is used as an input to generate 
service outputs (Zhu, 2011). In Omrani and Soltanzadeh (2016), these two interconnected stages 
are labelled as “production” and “consumption”, respectively. In addition, some outputs 
produced in the production stage in the current period could be transferred into the next period 
(Maghbouli,et al., 2014). The two-stage structure of our research is shown as Figure 3. 
Production
Consumption
Production Production
Consumption Consumption
  
Period 1 Period 2 Period T
Inputs for the first stage 
in period 1
Links from the first stage 
to the next in period 1
Carry-overs from the 
period 1 to period 2
Inputs for the first stage 
in period 2
Outputs for the second 
stage in period 1
Carry-overs from the 
period 2 to period 3 
Carry-overs from the 
period T to T+1 
Links from the first stage 
to the next in period 2
Outputs for the second 
stage in period 2
Outputs for the second 
stage in period T
Links from the first stage 
to the next in period T
Inputs for the first stage 
in period T
 
Figure 3. Two-stage structure of airline industry in this research 
The indicators selected for input, output, intermediate product and carry-over are explained as 
follows. The input and output data for Indian airlines are from India’s Directorate General of 
                                                          
4 Although a DMU may operate under variable returns to scale (VRS) in the short run, in the long run, it would 
adjust its capacity to move to CRS (Cummins and Xie, 2013). Therefore, CRS reflects the long run situation. Yu and 
Chen (2017) thus argue that in a multiperiod context, it is reasonable to adopt the assumption of CRS for the 
efficiency calculation. 
5 The non-radial SBM models do not assume proportional changes in inputs and outputs as the radial models do 
(Tone and Tsutsui, 2010). See Appendix 1 for a brief description for the Tone and Tsutsui (2014) model.    
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Civil Aviation while the Chinese data mainly come from the Statistical Data on Civil Aviation of 
China. 
Following previous literature (e.g., Duygun et al., 2016), two inputs, the number of employees 
and the number of aircraft are used in this study. The choice of the two inputs reflects the fact 
that the airline industry is both labour intensive and capital intensive. The non-oriented mode 
was chosen because airlines airlines can effectively control their inputs including employees and 
aircraft fleet and at the same time expand their outputs as much as possible over time. Two 
outputs are revenue passenger-kilometres (RPK) and revenue tonne-kilometres (RTK) that 
comprise the passengers, freight and mail carried multiplied by the distance flown. They are 
commonly used in previous literature (Yu, 2016). 
The first stage of the operation uses the inputs to generate flight capacities. Therefore, the 
number of departures and flying hours are used as intermediate products. This is consistent with 
Omrani and Soltanzadeh (2016) and Li and Cui (2017) in which the number of flights and 
available seat kilometres (ASK) were used as intermediate outputs. In fact, the number of 
departures and flying hours have a close association with an airline’s total capacity.  
Some carry-over activities can have an impact on the airline efficiency performance between two 
consecutive years (Cui et al., 2016). Tone and Tsutsui (2010) and Cui et al. (2016) believe that 
capital stock is not only an output of the current year, but also an input of the next year. 
Therefore, it can be treated as a carry-over variable or a dynamic factor. In this research, we 
believe that the network size of an airline measured by the number of destinations served can be 
used as a carry-over variable which not only affects the current period but also the subsequent 
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periods. The data for the network size variable are obtained from the airline schedule data in the 
IATA Airport Intelligence database.  
Five major Indian airlines and eight major Chinese airlines are included in our airline efficiency 
study. The chosen Indian airlines include two FSCs, Air India and Jet Airways, and three other 
major LCCs, Spicejet, IndiGo and GoAir. Except Air India, which is the flag carrier in India, the 
others are all privately owned. The Chinese airlines that we chose include the state-owned “big 
three” airlines, namely Air China, China Eastern and China Southern, and three private airlines, 
Spring Airlines, Juneyao Airlines and Okay Airways. Spring Airlines is the first and the largest 
LCC in China, whereas Juneyao and Okay are the earliest formed private airlines in China. The 
remaining two carriers, namely, Sichuan Airlines and Hainan Airlines have local government 
ownership. The annual data for the Indian and Chinese airlines required for the DNDEA model 
were collected for the efficiency analysis. Due to limited data availability, we only consider a 
period from 2008 to 2015. The descriptive statistics of the input, output, intermediate product and 
the carry-over variables are reported in Table 1. In our research, all the links are treated as “outputs” 
from the preceding process, and all the carry-overs are desirable and treated as outputs. The DEA-
Solver Pro software was used to produce the efficiency scores. 
It should be noted that the weights of period and stage will have an impact on the efficiency 
results and that the choice of period and stage weights are kind of arbitrary. As pointed out by Li 
and Cui (2017), many researchers have attempted to determine the optimal stage weights 
including Kao and Hwang (2014) and Kao (2014), but none of them have been widely accepted 
as reasonable approaches. As a result, quite a few studies on airline efficiency such as Lozano 
and Gutiérrez (2014) and Cui and Li (2017) assume equal weights for different production 
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stages. It is our view that for most airlines, the capacity production and service provision 
(consumption) are equally important and thus setting an average weight for each stage is 
reasonable and appropriate. This is also the case for the period weights that were set equal in 
previous studies using dynamic DEA models such as as Li et al. (2016) and Cui and Li (2017).  
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of the input, output, intermediate product and the carry-over variables 
Variable  Data source Mean Std. dev. Min Max  
Number of employees 
(input) 
India’s Directorate 
General of Civil 
Aviation; Statistical 
Data on Civil 
Aviation of China 
(2006-2016) 
21,521 27,716 763 103,228 
Number of aircraft (input) 119 139 6 506 
RPK (million) (output) 32,771 34,794 1,039 140,609 
RTK(million) (output) 3,391 3,800 94 15,748 
Number of departures 
(intermediate output) 
154,129 151,734 9,036 611,018 
Flying hours (intermediate 
output) 
374,495 390,485 15,967 1,590,642 
Number of destinations 
(carry-over) 
Airport Intelligence 
database 
540 472 18 1,397 
 
4.2 The second-stage regression model   
We wish to identify the drivers behind the airlines’ efficiency differences in China and India. 
The different efficiency results may reflect the different development patterns in the two aviation 
markets such as the LCC penetration, the airline competition intensity and the airline ownership 
as discussed at the beginning of this paper. We follow previous studies (e.g., Barros and 
Peypoch, 2009; Yuen et al., 2013) to regress our estimated overall airline DEA efficiency scores 
against some explanatory variables. Many recent studies such as Kweh et al. (2015), Lee and 
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Worthington (2015), Pointon and Matthews (2016) and Wanke et al. (2015) have also regressed 
the dynamic DEA scores against possible determinant factors. Therefore, in Eq. (1), airline 
efficiency score 𝐷𝑁𝐷𝐸𝐴𝑖𝑡  is expressed as a function of several explanatory variables that we are 
interested in. Most of these variables are also used in previous literature such as Saranga and 
Nagpal (2016). 
 𝐷𝑁𝐷𝐸𝐴̂ 𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐻𝐻𝐼_𝑅𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽4𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙%𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒_𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐻𝑆𝑅𝑖𝑡+𝜀𝑖𝑡 
(1) 
where the subscript 𝑖 stands for the airline, 𝑡 stands for the year, and  𝐷𝑁𝐷𝐸𝐴𝑖𝑡  is the true overall  
efficiency score for airline 𝑖 at time 𝑡. The estimated DNDEA efficiency score 𝐷𝑁𝐷𝐸𝐴̂ 𝑖𝑡 is 
restricted in the interval between 0 and 1, meaning that the true efficiency score 𝐷𝑁𝐷𝐸𝐴𝑖𝑡  over 1 
is unobservable. Therefore, a Tobit model can be used to estimate the coefficients in Eq. (1). 
𝐿𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡 is a dummy variable which equals one if the airline is an LCC. It is expected that LCCs are 
more efficient in operations given their great efforts in lowering operating costs and maximising 
outputs. 𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡 is a dummy variable that equals one if the airline is a state-owned airline or 
majority-owned by government. This variable is used to capture the effect of public ownership 
on airlines’ efficiency. 𝐻𝐻𝐼_𝑅𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡 is the average route-level HHI index, which shows how the 
airline competition intensity can affect airline efficiency. 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙%𝑖𝑡 is the share of RPK 
on the international routes for the airline.  It captures the international market involvement of an 
airline and has been found to have a significant impact on the technical and cost efficiency in 
previous studies (e.g., Saranga and Nagpal, 2016). 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒_𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 is the average stage length 
per trip for the airline. This distance measure captures the effect of route and network 
optimisation on airline efficiency. In the last decade, high speed rail (HSR) has emerged as a 
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significant transport mode in China (Li and Sheng, 2016). It has been an effective substitute for 
air transport on short and medium haul routes, posing a serious threat to the Chinese airlines 
(Zhang and Zhang, 2016). Therefore, the length of HSR is included as it is expected that 
competition from HSR would force airlines to improve their operational efficiency. 
Simar and Wilson (2007) have shown that the “naïve regression”6 on the DEA efficiency scores 
can result in biased estimations. This is because the usual estimation procedures assume 
independently distributed error terms, which may not be valid. The second-stage regression 
depends on the explanatory variables, which are not considered in the first-stage efficiency 
estimation. Thus, there can be a correlation between the efficiency scores and the error term in 
the second-stage regression (Barros and Peypoch, 2009). Simar and Wilson (2007) propose a 
bootstrap method to address the above issues so as to produce a consistent and unbiased 
estimator in the second-stage regression. The method has been applied in the efficiency studies 
of airlines and other transport modes (e.g., Yuen et al., 2013).  In this study, we also adopt the 
procedures proposed by Simar and Wilson (2007).7  
The variables of the regression were collected from various sources. Airport Intelligence 
database of IATA provides the airline-route specific passenger volume statistics, with which we 
can calculate the HHI index for the major routes. India’s Directorate General of Civil Aviation 
provides other Indian airlines statistics, including the share of international operations measured 
by RPK, and the average stage length. These variables for the Chinese airlines are collected from 
the airlines’ annual reports and the yearbooks “Statistical Data on Civil Aviation of China” 
                                                          
6 Naïve regression refers to the approach that directly uses the first-stage DEA scores to run the regressions in the 
second stage. 
7 See Appendix 2 for the details of this approach.  
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published by the CAAC. The data of the length of HSR were collected from the website of the 
Ministry of Transport of China and news media reports.  
5. Results and Analysis 
5.1 Results for airline efficiency  
The overall and period efficiency scores for the 13 airlines are reported in Table 2. The rank 
column shows the ranking of the airlines based on the overall efficiency score.    
Table 2. Overall DNDEA efficiency 
DMU 
Overall 
Score Rank 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Air India 0.9317 3 0.954 1 1 0.9635 0.9674 1 0.7921 0.8047 
Jet 
Airways 0.7152 8 0.5819 0.6235 0.7399 0.5446 0.8379 0.8632 0.844 0.8776 
SpiceJet 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Indigo 0.8574 6 0.7125 0.8389 0.9079 0.9063 0.9162 0.925 0.898 0.8037 
Goair 0.8768 5 1 0.8465 1 0.7887 0.8459 0.8795 0.8659 0.8325 
Air 
China 0.5336 11 0.5537 0.494 0.5285 0.4479 0.5595 0.5983 0.5712 0.558 
China 
Eastern 0.4057 13 0.3313 0.3385 0.3857 0.387 0.4704 0.4969 0.4537 0.473 
China 
Southern 0.4404 12 0.4119 0.3683 0.4173 0.4111 0.4528 0.518 0.5053 0.5039 
Hainan 0.6404 9 0.5899 0.5806 0.5747 0.5096 0.7333 0.8093 0.8052 0.6995 
Sichuan 0.9078 4 0.8794 0.9093 0.8964 0.9 0.915 0.9403 0.9435 0.8829 
Spring 0.9897 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.9641 0.9562 
Juneyao 0.8409 7 0.7101 0.8454 0.8623 0.875 0.8761 0.8909 0.8439 0.8547 
Okay 0.5805 10 0.5317 0.4902 0.4825 0.6469 0.6298 0.5905 0.6411 0.7163 
 
As can be seen from Table 1, two LCCs, China’s Spring and India’s SpiceJet consistently ranked 
in the first two places from 2008 to 2015, indicating the strong competitiveness of LCCs in both 
countries. Air India and China’ Sichuan Airlines ranked third and fourth, respectively, China’s 
“big three”, Air China, China Eastern, China Southern, are at the bottom of the ranking list. 
Their efficiency scores are much lower than India’s national carrier, Air India that is still state-
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owned. This is consistent with Jain and Natarajan (2015) and Saranga and Nagpal (2016), who 
assessed Indian airline efficiency using the traditional DEA approach and found that Air India 
was among the most technically efficient airlines in the period 2005–2012. Surprisingly, Jet 
Airways is the least efficient airline in India. It was the largest carrier in India between 2001 and 
2012 and was rated as one of the most efficient airlines in India in Saranga and Nagpal (2016). 
However, our research has shown that its efficiency performance was not so impressive, 
particularly before 2012. The different results produced in this research may be a result of the 
use of different estimation approaches. The DNDEA approach used here is obviously superior to 
the traditional model as our results can better explain the slow growth in the last decade. In fact, 
a recent analysis of Jet Airways’ financial data by Aggarwal (2017) finds that it has failed to 
improve its operational efficiency, which is a worrying sign for this carrier.  
Although not top-ranked, it is worth mentioning that China’s Okay, a private carrier, made 
noticeable progress in efficiency performance after 2011. Although Wang et al. (2018) suggest 
that China’s LCCs and private carriers have been operating in an unfriendly environment as the 
nation’s aviation policy is overly protective of the state-owned airlines, it seems that they have 
managed to achieve efficiency and outperformed their state-owned counterparts. It is also worth 
noting that most Chinese carriers exhibited a sign of improvement in efficiency since 2008, 
which is consistent with Wang et al. (2014) who claimed that Chinese airlines steadily improved 
their operational efficiency from 2001 to 2010, but they still lagged behind leading airlines in 
developed markets.  
Table 3 shows the airline efficiency in the production and consumption processes. 
1
oE and
2
oE
indicate the efficiency performance in the stages of production and consumption, respectively. 
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Consistent with the results in Table 2, SpiceJet achieved technical efficiency in both stages while 
China’s “big three” remained to be the bottom three in the two processes. These three state-
owned Chinese carriers’ efficiency scores are particularly low in the consumption stage, 
probably implying that they have failed to attract sufficient number of passengers and tonnes of 
freight compared with the size of their available capacities.  
Tables 4 and 5 present the efficiency changes of the 13 airlines from 2008 to 2015 in the 
production and consumption processes, repetitively. It can be seen that most airlines’ efficiency 
in production remained relatively stable throughout the study period while their efficiency 
performance in the consumption stage exhibited wider fluctuations. SpiceJet, GoAir, and Spring 
were technically efficient in the production stage in all the years under study. Sichuan Airlines’ 
efficiency score for production was one in every year from 2008 to 2014 and still close to one in 
2015. Air India was technically efficient in the production stage from 2008 to 2013, but its 
efficiency declined substantially in 2014 and 2015. Apart from 2008 and 2015, IndiGo was also 
operating at the efficient level during the study period. Tables 4 and 5 also show that China’s 
Okay followed an increasing trend after 2010. Its production stage efficiency improvement was 
particularly impressive. Air India was state-owned, but its efficiency performance in the 
consumption stage was far better than all the state-controlled Chinese carriers as shown in Table 
5. 
 
Table 3. Efficiency in different processes 
No. DMU 
1
oE  
2
oE  
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Score Rank Score Rank 
1 Air India 0.9317 3 0.9241 7 
2 Jet Airways 0.7152 8 0.8865 8 
3 SpiceJet 1 1 1 1 
4 Indigo 0.8574 6 0.982 5 
5 Goair 0.8768 5 1 1 
6 Air China 0.5336 11 0.4303 11 
7 China Eastern 0.4057 13 0.3636 13 
8 
China 
Southern 0.4404 12 0.3653 12 
9 Hainan 0.6404 9 0.6089 10 
10 Sichuan 0.9078 4 0.9956 4 
11 Spring 0.9897 2 1 1 
12 Juneyao 0.8409 7 0.9503 6 
13 Okay 0.5805 10 0.6822 9 
                         
   
Table 4. Efficiency performance in production process over time 
DMU 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Average Rank 
Air India 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.6892 0.7037 0.9241 7 
Jet 
Airways 0.7827 0.7879 0.8245 0.6969 1 1 1 1 0.8865 8 
SpiceJet 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Indigo 0.9309 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.9255 0.982 5 
Goair 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Air 
China 0.4571 0.4525 0.4721 0.3935 0.4188 0.4361 0.4111 0.4009 0.4303 11 
China 
Eastern 0.3243 0.3365 0.3662 0.3311 0.3759 0.4105 0.3768 0.3874 0.3636 13 
China 
Southern 0.3725 0.3535 0.3713 0.3548 0.3568 0.3786 0.3721 0.3628 0.3653 12 
Hainan 0.6366 0.5722 0.5801 0.5558 0.6094 0.6806 0.6482 0.5882 0.6089 10 
Sichuan 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.9644 0.9956 4 
Spring 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
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Juneyao 0.8008 0.9426 0.859 1 1 1 1 1 0.9503 6 
Okay 0.5307 0.558 0.5293 0.643 0.722 0.6927 0.844 0.9375 0.6822 9 
 
Table 5. Efficiency performance in consumption process over time 
DMU 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Average Rank 
Air India 0.912 1 1 0.9295 0.9369 1 0.8952 0.9089 0.9478 3 
Jet 
Airways 0.4631 0.5159 0.671 0.4469 0.7211 0.7594 0.7301 0.7819 0.6362 10 
SpiceJet 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Indigo 0.5771 0.7225 0.8313 0.8287 0.8454 0.8605 0.8148 0.7115 0.774 6 
Goair 1 0.7339 1 0.6511 0.733 0.7849 0.7635 0.713 0.7974 5 
Air 
China 0.6892 0.5439 0.6001 0.5115 0.781 0.8429 0.8209 0.809 0.6998 9 
China 
Eastern 0.3387 0.3406 0.4074 0.4462 0.5972 0.6007 0.5415 0.5749 0.4809 13 
China 
Souther
n 0.4606 0.3845 0.4758 0.4788 0.5896 0.7264 0.7077 0.7271 0.5688 11 
Hainan 0.5496 0.5886 0.5694 0.4704 0.8696 0.9478 0.9857 0.8351 0.727 8 
Sichuan 0.7847 0.8337 0.8122 0.8182 0.8433 0.8874 0.893 0.8154 0.836 4 
Spring 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.9307 0.916 0.9808 2 
Juneyao 0.6379 0.7668 0.8654 0.7778 0.7795 0.8032 0.7299 0.7462 0.7633 7 
Okay 0.5327 0.4371 0.4445 0.6503 0.5586 0.5201 0.5216 0.581 0.5307 12 
 
5.2 Results of second-stage regressions  
Table 6 presents the descriptive statistics for the second-stage explanatory variables. Our second-
stage regression results are collated in Table 7 for both the Tobit random effects and the 
bootstrap corrected model proposed in Simar and Wilson (2007).8 Overall, the Tobit random 
effects model and the bootstrapping procedure produce similar estimations.  
Table 6. Descriptive statistics for the second-stage DEA regression variables 9 
 
No. of Obs. Mean Std. dev. Min Max 
                                                          
8 Although widely used in the literature, this approach was criticised in Banker, Natarajan and Zhang (2019). That is 
why we also present the Tobit results. 
9 The public ownership dummy and LCC dummy have the same mean and standard deviation, which is a 
coincidence.   
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LCC Dummy 104 0.307 0.463 0 1 
Public Ownership Dummy 104 0.307 0.463 0 1 
HHI at Route Level 104 3,718 1,467 1,841 7,321 
Share of International RPK (100%) 104 22.56% 26.37% 0 97.86% 
Stage Length (km) 104 1,388 528 838 3,595 
HSR (km) 104 6,539 7,707 0 23,600 
 
      
Table 7. The Second-stage regression results of the DEA efficiency scores 
 
Tobit RE 
Bootstrap-
correction 
LCC 0.215*** 0.216*** 
 
(0.076) (0.062) 
Public Ownership -0.174** -0.192*** 
 
(0.083) (0.065) 
HHI at Route Level  -0.026 -0.040** 
 
(0.022) (0.018) 
Share of International RPK (%) 0.002* 0.0006 
 
(0.001) (0.001) 
Stage Length (1,000 Km) 0.008 0.167*** 
 
(0.034) (0.068) 
HSR 2.94 × 10−6*** 2.22 × 10−6 
 
(1. 25 × 10−6) 
 
(2.26 × 10−6) 
Constant 0.765*** 0.318 
 
(0.101) (0.365) 
No. of Obs 104 104 
Sigma u 0.107*** 0.123*** 
Sigma e 0.069*** - 
Note: (1) Standard errors are in parentheses. * 10% significance, ** 5% significance, *** 1% significance. 
(2) The “bootstrap-correction” is based on Simar and Wilson (2007). We use 500 bootstrap 
replications. 
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Our estimations suggest that LCCs are more efficient than FSCs which is consistent with the 
results of Barros and Peypoch (2009), and Lee and Worthington (2014). Private ownership in 
airlines promotes airline efficiency as suggested by both models. For the two quasi-private 
carriers, Sichuan and Hainan airlines,10 a robustness estimation has also been done to categorise 
them as a third type ownership given their mix of public and private ownership, and the results 
still show that the stated owned airlines tend to be inferior in operation efficiency. Ng and 
Seabright (2001) find that public ownership supports higher wages and thus reduces airline 
efficiency. With a sample of 42 major airlines around the world, Lee and Worthington (2014) 
also find that private airlines are more efficient than the state-owned ones. Rajagopalan and 
Zhang (2008) proposed a sound explanation: when the state dominates a firm, the state may use 
its influence to achieve the objectives of politicians, rather than protecting the interests of 
investors and shareholders. Zhang and Findlay (2010) find that India’s national carriers were 
frequently used to serve social goals in addition to commercial performance. When state-owned 
firms pursue other objectives, the ability to achieve efficiencies would be weakened (Martin and 
Parker, 1997). 
Route-level competition have a significant impact on airline efficiency as shown in the bootstrap 
corrected model, implying lower HHI, or stronger competition can make airlines more efficient. 
A higher presence of international market measured by the percentage of international RPK does 
not necessarily lead to a higher level of efficiency as shown in Table 5. The bootstrap corrected 
model suggest that longer stage length is associated with higher airline efficiency. The decline in 
airline unit costs with increasing stage length average stage length (i.e., the distance of a flight 
                                                          
10 Both airlines were established by local provincial government and other organisations but the influence from the 
government was much weaker compared with the state-owned “big three”.  
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segment) is considered as an important characteristic of airline operations. This is because airport 
charges, ground handling costs, and take-off and landing activities become relatively smaller per 
passenger kilometre as stage length increases. Also, longer stage length leads to higher aircraft 
and crew utilisation. Finally, the Tobit model indicates a significantly positive effect of HSR on 
airline efficiency, but the relationship is not statistically significant in the bootstrap corrected 
model. 
6. Policy Implication and Conclusion  
The DNDEA model used in this research considers the airline’s internal processes and their 
internal links as well as the carry-over items that connect consecutive periods. It has been found 
that three LCCs, namely, China’s Spring and India’s SpiceJet were the most efficient carriers in 
the period 2008-2015. China’s “big three” were the least efficient carriers. These findings are 
consistent with S&P Global Ratings’ 2016 report that India’s top 200 companies, particularly the 
private companies, outperform their Chinese counterparts (Allirajan, 2016). To find the source of 
inefficiency for each airline, we use Figure 4 to highlight the relative positions of each airline in 
the matrix format, with efficiency scores for the consumption stage on the vertical axis and 
efficiency scores for production on the horizontal axis. It can be seen that China Eastern and 
China Southern performed poorly in both consumption and production stages. They are the only 
two airlines that fall within Quadrant 3. Air China lies in Quadrant 4, suggesting a relatively low 
efficiency in the consumption stage. Therefore, there is much room for the state-owned Chinese 
carriers to improve their efficiency in the service stage. For example, flight delay, a significant 
dimension of airline service quality, has been confirmed to have a close link with Chinese 
airlines’ technical efficiency performance by Tsionas et al. (2017). However, Zhang and Zhang 
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(2016) note that frequent flight delays in China have long frustrated passengers in China, 
although some of the reasons causing delays are beyond the airlines’ control, such as airport 
congestion and the lack of sufficient airspace for civil aviation flights, which should be 
addressed at the national level.  
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
Efficiency scores for production
E
ff
ic
ie
n
c
y
 s
c
o
r
e
s 
fo
r
 c
o
n
su
m
p
ti
o
n Spring
SpiceJet
GoAir
Juneyao
Air India
Okay
IndiGo
Sichuan
0.5
0.5
Hainan
Jet Airways
Air ChinaChina Eastern
China Southern
 
Figure 4.  Airline efficiency scores in the production and consumption processes. 
Airline distribution might be another area that affects airlines’ efficiency in Chinese carriers’ 
service stage. Chinese state-owned carriers use three channels to sell their tickets: online direct 
sales from their official website, online sales from third-party platforms such as online travel 
agent Ctrip, and air ticket sales agents using CAAC TravelSky Technology’s booking system. In 
2010, the “big three’s” direct sales share was only about 10% and the airlines had to pay large 
amount of commission fees to the sales agents. The commission fees paid to the sale agents 
amounted to RMB 5 billion in 2009. However, the most important loss to the airlines for the low 
share of direct sales might be that they do not own the travellers purchase behaviour data and 
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thus lose the opportunity to innovate and personalise their distribution model to attract customers 
and increase the load factor.11  
The second-stage regression results confirm that the LCC model and private ownership are 
significantly associated with overall airline efficiency performance. Despite 100% owned by the 
Indian government, Air India is still much more efficient than its Chinese counterparts, probably 
indicating that state-owned airlines operating in an environment dominated by private and LCCs 
tend to become stronger in efficiency. China eased investment access to aviation industry in 
early 2018, allowing private capital to account for more than 50% of their equity as long as the 
government remains to be the largest single shareholder. This move will likely improve the 
efficiency of the state-owned carriers. However, what is even important is to create a level 
playing field for both private carriers, LCCs and state-owned airlines in China. Unlike the state-
owned counterparts that have various channels to raise funds including government cash 
injection and bank finance for their fleet expansion, it is very difficult for a private carrier to 
borrow money from China’s state-owned banks as airline industry is deemed as a high-risk 
industry. Raising money from the stock exchange market could be another possible channel, but 
the initial public offering (IPO) process is lengthy, unpredictable and lack of transparency in 
China. Spring and Juneyao were not approved to launch the IPO on the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange until 2015. By this time many other private carriers established at the same time with 
them had already failed due to the capital shortage and other reasons. In addition, China’s current 
aviation policy on market access and airport slot allocation, and competition policy on airline 
mergers still favour the state-owned airlines and discriminate against the private ones. Continual 
                                                          
11 In 2015, the “big three’s” parent companies that represent the Chinese government required that the state-
owned carriers should improve their direct sales share to 50% in the next three years. 
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reforms in China’s air transport sector including further privatisation and policy support for 
LCCs and private carriers are much needed in order to improve the overall efficiency of this 
industry.   
There are several limitations of this study. First, it is well known that in many developed 
economies, outsourcing is one of the strategies that can help airlines reduce costs and improve 
efficiency. In the developing economies like China and India, this practice is less common, but it 
is increasing and will become trendy in the near future. Obviously this research does not account 
for this issue, nor does it distinguish the full-time and part-time employees as the employee data 
compiled by the two nations’ aviation authorities do not give any details of these issues, which 
may have an impact on the efficiency results. Second, it is should be acknowledged that each 
airline uses different airplanes models with different transport capacities and that without 
considering the size of the aircraft and its acquisition methods, distortion can arise in the 
efficiency calculation, despite the fact that for airlines, most of the production and sales activities 
are organised around each scheduled flight, regardless of the size of the aircraft, which may 
partly justify the use of the number of aircraft in many DEA studies on airline efficiency. Finally, 
the equal weight assumption for different stages and periods may not be realistic in some cases 
and can create distortion in efficiency calculations. This issue should be addressed in future 
research.  
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Appendix 1: The DNDEA model description 
To measure the efficiency of n DMUs (j=1,…,n) with a consideration of k stages (k=1,2) over t periods (t 
=1,… T) ,In our case, we talk about the period from 2008 to 2015, where T=8. We followed Tone and 
Tsutsui (2014) and use the following notations for the indicators used in the DNDEA model. We denote 
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the link from stage k to stage h by (k, h) and the set of links by l(k,h) (l(1,2)=2), while the carry-over set in k 
stage as l’k (l’1=1).  
t
ijkx R  (i=1,…,mk; j=1,…,n; t=1,…, T; k=1,2) is i th input of DMUj for stage k in period t. mk (m1=2) is 
the number of inputs for stage k. 
t
rjky R  (r=1,…,rk; j=1,…,n; t=1,…,T; k=1,2) is r th output of DMUj for stage k in period t. rk (r2=2) is the 
number of outputs from stage k. 
( , )
t
j k h lz R
 (j=1,…,n; (k,h)=(1,2); t=1,…,T; l=1,…, l(k,h)) is l th intermediate products of DMUj from stage 
k to stage h in period t. In our research, all the links are treated as outputs from the preceding process. 
( , 1)
'
t t
jklc R


 (j=1,…,n; t=1,…,T-1; k=1,2; l’=1,…,l’k) is l’ th carry-over of DMUj at stage k from period t to 
next period t+1. In our research, all the carry-overs are desirable and treated as outputs. 
The production possibility set   ( , 1)( ), , ,t t t t t tk k kh kP  x y z c is defined by  
1
( 1,2, 1,..., )
nt t t
k jk jkj
k t T

   x x                                                                                               (A1) 
1
( 1,2, 1,..., )
nt t t
k jk jkj
k t T

   y y                                                                                                (A2) 
( ) ( )1
(( , ) (1,2), 1,..., )
nt t t
kh j kh jkj
k h t T

  z z (links as outputs from k in period t)                           (A3) 
( ) ( )1
(( , ) (1,2), 1,..., )
nt t t
kh j kh jhj
k h t T

  z z (links as inputs to h in period t)                                  (A4) 
( , 1) ( , 1)
1
( 1,2, 1,..., )
nt t t t t
k jk jkj
k t T 

  c c (as carry-over for stage k from t)                                    (A5) 
( , 1) ( , 1) +1
1
( 1,2, 1,..., )
nt t t t t
k jk jkj
k t T 

   c c (as carry-over for stage k to t+1)                                 (A6) 
0( 1,2, 1,2..., , 1,2..., )tjk k j n t T      (intensity of DMUj corresponding to stage k at period t)(A7) 
Inputs and outputs: 
DMUo(o=1,…,n)∈P can be expressed as follows. 
1
+ ( , , )
nt t t t
iok ijk jk iokj
x x s i k t 

                                                                                                      (A8) 
1
( , , )
nt t t t
iok ijk jk iokj
y y s i k t 

                                                                                                     (A9) 
1
1( , )
n t
jkj
k t

                                                                                                                        (A10) 
0( , , )tjk j k t     , 0( , , )
t
ioks i k t
     , 0( , , )tioks i k t
                                                                 (A11) 
Where 
t
ioks
 and tioks
  indicate imput and output slacks, respectively. 
Links: 
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( , ) ( , )1 1
( ( , ), 1,... ( , ), )
n nt t t t
j k h l jk j k h l jhj j
z z k h l l k h t 
 
                                                                   (A12) 
( ) ( , ) ( , )1
( ( , ), 1,..., ( , ), )
nt t t t
o kh l j k h l jk o k h lj
z z s k h l l k h t

                                                                   (A13) 
where ( , )
t
o k h ls is slack for the links in our case. 
Carry-overs: 
( , 1) ( , 1) 1
' '1 1
( ' 1,... ' , , 1,... 1)
n nt t t t t t
jkl jk jkl jk kj j
c c l l k t T   
 
                                                                   (A14) 
( , 1) ( , 1) ( , 1)
' ' '1
( ' 1,... ' , , )
nt t t t t t t
okl jkl jk okl kj
c c s l l k t  

                                                                                (A15) 
where ( , 1)'
t t
okls
 is slack for the carry over in our case. 
Following Tone and Tsutsui (2014), the overall efficiency for the DNDEA model is: 
( , )
1 1 1
( , 1)
’( , ) '
( , 1)1 1 1 1 ' 1
( , ) ( , ) '
1
1
min
1
1
’
k
k k h k
t
T K mt iok
k tt k i
k ioksys
o
tt t t
T K r l lo k h lt iok okl
k t t t tt k i l l
k k h k iok o k h l okl
s
W w
m x
E
ss s
W w
r l l y z c

  
 
    
  
  
  
   
            
  
    
                 (A16) 
where 
1
1
T t
t
W

 , 0( 1,..., )tW t T   and 1 1
K
kk
w

 , 0( 1,2)kw k    
And the period efficiency can be defined by:  
( , )
1 1
( , )
( , 1)
’( , ) '
( , 1)1 1 1 ' 1
( , ) ( , ) '
1
1
min
1
1
’
k
k k h k
t
K m iok
k tk i
k iokt sys
o tt t t
K r l lo k h liok okl
k t t t tk i l l
k k h k iok o k h l okl
s
w
m x
E t
ss s
w
r l l y z c

 
 
   
 
 
  
  
         
 
   
                          (A17) 
The stage efficiency can be defined by: 
( , )
1 1
( , 1)
’( , ) '
( , 1)1 1 1 ' 1
( , ) ( , ) '
1
1
min
1
1
’
k
k k h k
t
T mt iok
tt i
k iokk
o tt t t
T r l lo k h lt iok okl
t t t tt i l l
k k h k iok o k h l okl
s
W
m x
E k
ss s
W
r l l y z c

 
 
   
 
 
  
  
         
 
   
                              (A18) 
The period-stage efficiency can be defined by: 
 
( , )
1
( , )
( , 1)
’( , ) '
( , 1)1 1 ' 1
( , ) ( , ) '
1
1
min ,
1
1
’
k
k k h k
t
m iok
ti
t k k iok
o tt t t
r l lo k h liok okl
t t t ti l l
k k h k iok o k h l okl
s
m x
E t k
ss s
r l l y z c


 
  

  
 
       

  
                                    (A19) 
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Appendix 2: 
The second-stage regression is specified as follows, 
 
 𝐷𝑁𝐷𝐸𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐻𝐻𝐼_𝑅𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽4𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙%𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒_𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐻𝑆𝑅+𝜀𝑖𝑡 
(A20) 
 
We can write it in the following matrix format as, 
 
 𝐷𝑁𝐷𝐸𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 𝒁𝒊𝒕𝜷+𝜀𝑖𝑡 (A21) 
 
where 𝒁𝒊𝒕 is the vector of the control variables for DMU 𝑖 at time 𝑡. 𝜷 is the parameter 
vector we need to estimate. However, the true 𝐷𝑁𝐷𝐸𝐴𝑖𝑡 is unknown. And our obtained 
DNDEA in the first stage is just the estimated values, 𝐷𝑁𝐷𝐸𝐴𝑖𝑡̂ . Thus, our second-stage 
regression is based on the following relationship,  
 
 𝐷𝑁𝐷𝐸𝐴𝑖𝑡̂ = 𝒁𝒊𝒕𝜷+𝜀𝑖𝑡 (A22) 
 
 
But both the correlation among the 𝜀𝑖𝑡, and correlation between 𝒁𝒊𝒕 and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 emerge with 
the use of 𝐷𝑁𝐷𝐸𝐴𝑖𝑡 . We adopt the bootstrap algorithm proposed by Simar and Wilson 
(2007) as follows, 
 
[1]. Use the original data to compute the 𝐷𝑁𝐷𝐸𝐴𝑖𝑡̂ . 
[2]. Use the maximum likelihood method to obtain an estimate ?̂?  of 𝜷  as well as an 
estimate of 𝜎?̂? of 𝜎𝜀 (the variance of 𝜀𝑖𝑡) in the truncated regression of 𝐷𝑁𝐷𝐸𝐴𝑖𝑡̂  on 𝒁𝒊𝒕 in 
A22 using the 𝑚 < 𝑛 observations where 𝐷𝑁𝐷𝐸𝐴𝑖𝑡̂ < 1.  
[3]. Loop over the next three steps ([3.1]- [3.3]) 500 times to obtain a set of bootstrap 
estimates of  ?̂? and 𝜎?̂?: 
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[3.1]. For each 𝑖𝑡 = 1,2, … , 𝑚 , draw 𝜀𝑖𝑡  from the N(0, 𝜎?̂?
2)  distribution with right-
truncation at (1 − 𝒁𝒊𝒕 ?̂?). 
[3.2]. Again for each 𝑖𝑡, compute 𝐷𝑁𝐷𝐸𝐴𝑖𝑡
∗ = 𝒁𝒊𝒕 ?̂? + 𝜀𝑖𝑡. 
[3.3]. Use the maximum likelihood method to estimate the truncated regression of 
𝐷𝑁𝐷𝐸𝐴𝑖𝑡
∗
 on 𝒁𝒊𝒕, yielding estimates (?̂?
∗, 𝜎?̂?
∗
). 
[4]. Use the bootstrap values and the original estimates ?̂? and 𝜎?̂? to construct estimated 
confidence intervals for each element of 𝜷. 
